Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

William Huckins v. Nannette Rolfe, bureau chief
driver control bureau, driver license division,
department of public safety, State of Utah : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jason Schatz; Petitioner/Appellee.
Brent A. Burnett; Attorney for Resondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Huckins v. Rolfe, No. 20080108 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/709

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM HUCKINS,
Petitioner/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

NANNETTE ROLFE, Bureau Chief Driver
Control Bureau, Driver License Division,
Department of Public Safety, State of Utah

:

Respondent/Appellant.

Case No. 20080108-CA

:
:

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Judge Denise Lindberg

BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: (801) 366-0533
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
JASON SCHATZ
57 West 200 South
American Plaza II, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Petitioner/Appellee
A
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT
REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 2 2 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM HUCKINS,
Petitioner/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

NANNETTE ROLFE, Bureau Chief Driver
Control Bureau, Driver License Division,
Department of Public Safety, State of Utah

:

Respondent/Appellant.

Case No. 20080108-CA

:
:

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Judge Denise Lindberg

BRENT A. BURNETT (4003)
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: (801) 366-0533
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
JASON SCHATZ
57 West 200 South
American Plaza II, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Petitioner/Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT
REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

LIST OF ALL PARTIES
To the best of Respondent's/Appellant's knowledge, all interested parties appear in
the caption of this Brief.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING SECTION 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii)
AS APPLYING TO ALL STATUTES CONCERNING SUSPENSIONS OF
DRIVERS' LICENSES

2

CONCLUSION

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

10

Addendum A - Determinative Statutes

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Aiax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990)

2

First Security Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County. 866 P.2d 1250 (Utah App 1993)

8

Hallv.Dep'tofCorr.. 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958

4-5

Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980)

4

Okland Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)

8

Sindt v. Retirement Bd.. 2007 UT 16, 157 P.3d 797

5

State v. Gallegos. 2007 UT 81,171 P.3d 426

2

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2007)

1-2, 4, 6

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517 (West Supp. 2007)

2, 4, 6, 7

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (West Supp. 2007)

6, 7

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 (West Supp. 2007)

1,2, 5-6, 7

Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (West Supp. 2007)

-ii-

1-9

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM HUCKINS,

:

Petitioner/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20080108-CA

NANNETTE ROLFE,
Respondent/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Huckins' driver's license was suspended for 18 months pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6a-521 (West Supp. 2007) (permitting suspension of a driver's license for
refusal to submit to a chemical test to determine blood or breath alcohol level). Instead of
considering the correct statute, Huckins urges this Court to apply Utah Code Ann. § 53-3223 (West Supp. 2007) (permitting suspension of a driver's license for driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs). Huckins further compounds the error by asking this Court
to read Subsection 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii) independent of the remainder of the statute. His
interpretation of this subsection renders other provisions of the section meaningless and
would make Section 41-6a-521 superfluous and inoperative.
Section 53-3-223 permits a license suspended for 90 days under Subsection (7)(a)
to be reinstated if a criminal charge under either Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West
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Supp. 2007) or Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517 (West Supp. 2007) is dismissed or reduced.
Subsection (7)(b) does not mandate such a reinstatement if the suspension was for one
year. The district court erred in applying this subsection to the eighteen-month
suspension under Section 41-6a-521. The legislature's recent clarification of the meaning
of Subsection 7 also makes it clear that the district court erred; its interpretation of the
statute should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING SECTION 533-223(7)(b)(ii) AS APPLYING TO ALL STATUTES CONCERNING
SUSPENSIONS OF DRIVERS' LICENSES
Huckins asks this Court to interpret one sentence of Section 53-3-223 out of
context and without considering the remainder of the statute. This is contrary to Utah's
rules of statutory construction. "A principal rule of statutory construction is that the
terms of a statute should not be interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, but as a whole." Ajax
Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Common. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). A case
cited by the petitioner is to the same effect:
"We read the plain language of a statute . . . as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute." "We do
so because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent."
State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ^[12, 171 P.3d 426 (citations omitted).
But Huckins does not look to all of Section 53-3-223 to establish its meaning. He
does not look to all of Subsection 7 to establish its meaning. Nor does he seek to
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harmonize all of Subsection 7(b). Instead, he asks this Court to interpret Subsection
7(b)(ii) without considering its placement in the statute as a whole and how it relates to
the remainder of the statute's provisions. Reading the statute as a whole makes it clear
that Subsection 7(b)(ii), like all of Subsection 7(b), was meant to apply only to 90-day
suspensions under Subsection 7(a). It was never meant to apply to all drivers' license
suspension statutes wherever found in the Utah Code.
Section 53-3-223 provides for the suspension of a driver's license when either a
chemical test shows, or a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe, that a person is
driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both. Utah Code Ann.
§ 53-3-223(3) (West Supp. 2007). A first violation of this statute is punished by a 90-day
suspension of the offender's driver's license and a one-year suspension for a second or
subsequent violation. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(7)(a). In certain limited
circumstances, a license suspended for 90 days under this statute can be reinstated:
(b)(i) Notwithstanding the provisions in Subsection (7)(a)(i), the division
shall reinstate a person's license prior to completion of the 90 day
suspension period imposed under Subsection (7)(a)(i) if the person's charge
for a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517 is reduced or dismissed
prior to completion of the suspension period.
(ii) The division shall immediately reinstate a person's license upon
receiving written verification of the person's dismissal of a charge for a
violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517.
(iii) The division shall reinstate a person's license no sooner than 60 days
beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest upon receiving written
verification of the person's reduction of a charge for a violation of Section
41-6a-502or41-6a-517.
(iv) If a person's license is reinstated under this Subsection (7)(b), the
person is required to pay the license reinstatement fees under Subsections
53-3-105(29) and (30).
-3-

Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(7)(b) (West Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
The meaning of this statute is plain. Subsection 7(b)(i) permits a driver's license
that was suspended for 90 days (as opposed to one year) to be reinstated if and only if a
criminal charge under Sections 502 or 517 is either reduced or dismissed. Subsection
7(b)(ii) establishes the timing for the reinstatement of the license if the criminal charge
was dismissed (immediately upon the division receiving written verification of the
dismissal). Subsection 7(b)(iii) establishes the timing for the reinstatement of the license
if the criminal charge was reduced (no sooner than 60 days after the suspension upon the
division receiving written verification).
Subsection 7(b) only applies to 90-day suspensions under Subsection 7(a). It does
not apply to one-year suspensions under the statute, let alone suspensions provided for by
other statutes. Subsections 7(b)(ii) & (iii) are not independent provisions. They simply
identify the timing for the reinstatement of licenses under Subsection 7(b)(1).
Huckins' interpretation renders Subsection 7(b)(i) meaningless. Its limited
reinstatement of 90-day suspensions is swallowed up and made meaningless if Subsection
7(b)(ii) is read to grant a universal reinstatement of all suspensions under the same
circumstances. This violates another rule of statutory instruction: "statutory enactments
are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . .
interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or
absurd." Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). See also Hall v.
Dep'tofCorr.. 2001 UT 34, ^[15, 24 P.3d 958 ("[W]e accordingly avoid interpretations
-4-

that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative."). The same point is
made by a case relied upon by Huckins:
This court presumes "that the terms of a statute are used advisedly" by the
legislature. "Therefore, effect should be given to each such word, phrase,
clause, and sentence where reasonably possible."
Sindt v. Retirement Bd.. 2007 UT 16, ^8, 157 P.3d 797 (citations omitted).
Nor is Subsection 7(b)(i) the only provision that Huckins* interpretation renders
superfluous or inoperative. In order to make Subsection 7(b)(ii) applicable to all
suspensions of driver's licenses, Huckins claims that Section 53-2-223 is universally
applicable:
Although Utah's Implied Consent law can be found in U.C.A. § 416a-520, whether the driver submitted to a chemical test or whether he
refused the chemical test, the request for an administrative hearing is always
made pursuant to U.C.A. § 53-2-223(6)(a).
(6) (a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the
division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days
after the date of arrest. The request to be heard shall be made within ten
calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (5).
Brief of Appellee at 6 (emphasis added). But administrative hearings concerning a
refusal to submit to a chemical test are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 (West
Supp. 2007), not Section 53-2-223:
(1) (a) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's
intention to revoke the person's license under Section 41-6a-520 is entitled
to a hearing.
(b) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar
days after the day on which notice is provided.
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(c) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the
Driver License Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard
within 29 days after the date of arrest.

Section 41-6a-521(1).
Indeed, the title to Section 41-6a-521 is "Revocation hearing for refusal - Appeal."
If, as claimed by Huckins, Section 53-2-223 applies to revocation hearings for refusal to
submit to a chemical test, then Section 41-6a-521 is made irrelevant and meaningless.
Huckins1 interpretation is contrary to Utah's rules of statutory construction.
Comparing the two statutes makes it clear which applies to revocation hearings for
refusal to submit to a chemical test under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (West Supp.
2007). Section 53-2-223(3) permits suspension of a driver's license: "If the person
submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol content in
violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517, or if a peace officer makes a determination,
based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in violation of Section 41-6a502 .. . ." But Section 41-6a-521(5)(b) authorizes the suspension of a driver's license if
"the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested to submit to a
chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests . . . ."
If a driver's license is suspended under Section 53-2-223, the suspension is for
either 90 days or one year. Section 41-6a-521(5)(a) calls for a suspension of either
eighteen months or twenty four months. Clearly Huckins' eighteen-month suspension
was under Section 41-6a-521 and not Section 53-2-223.
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While all of Section 41-6a-521 deals with suspension of a license for failure to
submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6a-520, such a failure to submit is only
mentioned once in Section 53-2-223. Subsection 53-2-223(6)(c) permits the division to
consider ff(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was
driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517; (ii) whether the
person refused to submit to the test; and (iii) the test results, if any.11 These three factual
questions are relevant to a determination of whether a person was driving under the
influence. But Subsection 41-6a-521(3) sets out the issues to be considered in deciding if
a license should be suspended for failure to submit to a chemical test:
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person
was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502, 41-6a-517,
41-6a-530, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; and
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section
41-6a-520.
Section 41-6a-521 adds three further statutes, not mentioned in Section 53-2-223,
for which a refusal to submit to a chemical test can lead to a driver's license suspension.
A review of the two statutes shows many other subsections that fulfill the same purposes.
Section 41-6a-521 can only be made meaningful if Section 53-3-223 is interpreted as
applying only to administrative proceedings to suspend a driver's license for driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs. Applying Section 53-2-223 to suspension proceedings
for refusal to submit to testing leaves Section 41-6a-521 superfluous and inoperative.
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Huckins also claims that clarifying amendments, such as those the legislature
adopted to reject the district court's interpretation of Subsection 53-3-223(7)(b)(ii), should
not be given retroactive effect:
U.C.A. § 68-3-3 specifically states that "No part of these revised
statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Although S.B. 15
indicates that it "clarifies that certain license reinstatement provisions only
apply to a certain 90 day suspension period imposed by the Driver License
divisions [sic]", it make [sic] no mention of a retroactive application of the
alleged "clarification" of the immediate reinstatement statute.
Brief of Appellee at 8.
Huckins fails to note that both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have held
that when the legislature adds a clarifying provision to a statute, it generally is given
retroactive effect. First Sec. Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d 1250, 1251 n.3
(Utah App. 1993) (giving retroactive effect to an amendment that provided a definition
for a term used in a tax statute). Giving retroactive effect to the clarifying amendment
does not deprive a party of any rights.
It is true, as the employer Okland contends: that it is entitled to have
its rights determined on the basis of the law as it existed at the time of the
occurrence; and that a later statute or amendment should not be applied in a
retroactive manner to deprive a party of his rights or impose greater liability
upon him. FN2. But this principle has no application where the later
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to
how the law should have been understood prior to its enactment.
FN2. This long established rule is enacted in our statutes, Sec. 68-3-3,
U.C.A. 1953; and see Industrial Commission v. Agee, 56 Utah 63, 189 P.
414, 58 Am.Jur., Workmens Comp., Sec. 73.
Okland Constr. Co. v. Indus. Common. 520 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974).
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Neither the statute relied upon by Huckins nor the court decisions require an
express declaration by the legislature that an amendment should be given retroactive
affect. If the amendment is a clarification or amplification as to how the law should have
been understood prior to its enactment, the amendment should be given retroactive effect.
That is the case in the present action. The legislature's amendment both clarifies and
amplifies how Subsection 7(b) should have been interpreted all along. The legislature
expressly identified it as such. It was a response to the district court's decision in this
action. It should be given retroactive affect and Subsection 7(b)(ii) should be interpreted
in accord with the clarifying amendments passed by the legislature.
The district court erroneously interpreted Subsection 7(b)(ii) as applying to all
statutes that authorize suspensions of drivers' licenses. The court did this even though
Subsection 7(b)(i) clearly limited the reach of the statute to 90-day suspensions under
Subsection 7(a). The legislature amended Subsection 7(b) for the express purpose of
clarifying that Subsection 7(b) only applied to 90-day suspensions under Subsection 7(a).
Huckins convinced the district court to apply the wrong statute. Then, Huckins
convinced the district court to interpret Subsection 53-2-223(7)(b)(ii) out of context and
in a manner that made Subsection 53-2-223(7)(b)(i) meaningless. This Court should
reverse the district court's interpretation of this subsection and overrule that court's order
reinstating the petitioner's driver's license. Because the district court granted the
petitioner's motion before holding a trial de novo, this action should be remanded to the
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district court for further proceedings, if any, based on other challenges that the petitioner
may have to the suspension of his driver's license.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this Court to reverse the district
court's judgment and remand this action for any necessary further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^

day of July, 2008.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Respondent/Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following on this
July, 2008:
JASON SCHATZ
Attorney at Law
57 West 200 South
American Plaza II, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee

^£e?J
-10-

s7l J$**Us

_ day of

ADDENDUM "A

41-6a-521. Revocation hearing for refusal — AppeaL (West Supp. 2007)
(1) (a) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention
to revoke the person's license under Section 41-6a-520 is entitled to a hearing.
(b) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days
after the day on which notice is provided.
(c) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver
License Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after
the date of arrest.
(d) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License
Division under this Subsection (1), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the
state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of:
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (l)(d)(ii) applies; or
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous:
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years
from the date of arrest under Section 41-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223,
53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the
date of arrest under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that
would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), if a hearing is requested by the
person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in
which the offense occurred.
(b) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the
Driver License Division and the person both agree.
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502, 41-6a-517, 41-6a-530,
53-3-231, or 53-3-232; and
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section
41-6a-520.
(4) (a) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent:
(i) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
and the production of relevant books and papers; and
(ii) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(b) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78B-1-119.
(5) (a) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person
was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or
tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the
notice, the Driver License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a
motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of:
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (5)(a)(ii) applies; or
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous:

(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years
from the date of arrest under Section 41-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530, 53-3-223,
53-3-231, or 53-3-232; or
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the
date of arrest under Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that
would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502.
(b) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to
any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which
shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative
costs.
(c) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision
following a proceeding allowed under Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper.
(6) (a) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division
under this section following an administrative hearing may seek judicial review.
(b) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial.
(c) Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred.
Utah Code Ann. 53-3-223 (West Supp. 2007). Chemical test for driving under the
influence — Temporary license — Hearing and decision — Suspension and fee —
Judicial review.
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating
or has violated Section 41-6a-502, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain
blood or breath alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug,
alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol or while having any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of
Section 41-6a-517, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the person, request
that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with
the standards under Section 41-6a-520.
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6a-502 includes any similar local ordinance
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6a-510(l).
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a chemical
test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517 shall, and
the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely
driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license to
drive a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath
alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517, or if a peace officer
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in
violation of Section 41-6a-502, a peace officer shall, on behalf of the division and within
24 hours of arrest, give notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's license to
drive a motor vehicle.
(4) (a) When a peace officer gives notice on behalf of the division, the peace officer shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver;

(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; and
(iii) supply to the driver, in a manner specified by the division, basic information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division,
(b) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the
division, also serve as the temporary license certificate.
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division within ten calendar
days after the day on which notice is provided:
(a) the person's license certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating the chemical test
results, if any; and
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the person has violated
Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517.
(6) (a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the division shall grant to the
person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be
heard shall be made within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under
Subsection (5).
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b)(ii), a hearing, if held, shall be before the
division in the county in which the arrest occurred.
(ii) The division may hold a hearing in some other county if the division and the person
both agree.
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and
the production of relevant books and papers; or
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in
accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28.
(e) The division may designate one or more employees to conduct the hearing.
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any designated employee is as valid as if
made by the division.
(7) (a) If, after a hearing, the division determines that a peace officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 416a-502 or 41-6a-517, if the person failed to appear before the division as required in the
notice, or if a hearing is not requested under this section, the division shall suspend the
person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle for a period of:
(i) 90 days beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a first suspension; or
(ii) one year beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a second or subsequent
suspension for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years.

(b) (i) Notwithstanding the provisions in Subsection (7)(a)(i), the division shall reinstate a
person's license prior to completion of the 90 day suspension period imposed under
Subsection (7)(a)(i) if the person's charge for a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a517 is reduced or dismissed prior to completion of the suspension period.
(ii) The division shall immediately reinstate a person's license upon receiving written
verification of the person's dismissal of a charge for a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or
41-6a-517.
(iii) The division shall reinstate a person's license no sooner than 60 days beginning on
the 30th day after the date of arrest upon receiving written verification of the person's
reduction of a charge for a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517.
(iv) If a person's license is reinstated under this Subsection (7)(b), the person is required
to pay the license reinstatement fees under Subsections 53-3-105(29) and (30).
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under
Subsection 53-3-205(13) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 53-3-105 to
cover administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is
reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing
or court decision that the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this section
following an administrative hearing may file a petition within 30 days after the
suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 53-3-224.

